Accepted Papers

The Review of Economic Studies is one of the most highly respected academic journals in the field of economics. It is known for publishing leading research in all areas of economics, from microeconomics to macroeconomics. The journal is published by the Oxford University Press.

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Counterfactual Identification and Latent Space Enumeration in Discrete Outcome Models

Jiaying Gu, Thomas M. Russell, and Thomas Stringham

This paper provides a unified framework for studying the identification of counterfactual parameters in a general class of discrete outcome models, allowing for endogenous regressors and multidimensional latent variables, all without parametric distributional assumptions. Our main theoretical result is that, when the covariates are discrete, the infinite-dimensional latent variable distribution can be replaced with a finite-dimensional version that is equivalent from an identification perspective.

Quantifying the Benefits of Labor Mobility in a Currency Union

Christopher L. House, Christian Proebsting, and Linda L. Tesar

Unemployment differentials are greater between countries in the euro area than between U.S. states. In both regions, net migration responds to unemployment differentials, though the response is smaller in the euro area compared to the United States. We use a multi-country DSGE model with cross-border migration to quantify Mundell’s hypothesis that labor mobility could substitute for independent monetary policy in a currency union.

Bargaining Foundations for the Outside Option Principle

Dilip Abreu and Mihai Manea

We study a bargaining game in which a seller can trade with one of two buyers, who have values h and l (h > l). The outside option principle (OOP) predicts that the seller trades with the high-value buyer with probability converging to 1 at a price converging to max(h/2, l) as players become patient. While this prediction is supported by the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), a wide range of trading outcomes may emerge in subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs): in the patient limit, the seller can obtain any price in the interval [h/2, h] (and no other); moreover, allocative inefficiency and costly delay are possible.

Search Direction: Position Externalities and Position Auction Bias

Simon P. Anderson and Régis Renault

We formulate a tractable model of pricing under directed search with heterogeneous firm demands. Demand characteristics drive bids in a position auction and enable us to bridge insights from the ordered search literature to those in the position auction literature. Equilibrium pricing implies that the marginal consumer’s surplus decreases down the search order, so consumers optimally follow the firms’ position ordering. A firm suffers from “business stealing” by firms that precede it and “search appeal” from subsequent firms.

Revisiting the Non-Parametric Analysis of Time-Inconsistent Preferences

Federico Echenique and Gerelt Tserenjigmid

We revisit the recent revealed preference analysis of sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic consumers by Blow, Browning, and Crawford (2021) (BBC). We show that BBC’s revealed preference test is too lax. There are non-rationalizable data that would pass their test. A basic problem with their test is that it requires finding a certain endogenous elasticity, without regard to the rationalizing utility. Their approach motivates a more stringent test, also based on first-order conditions, that would connect the endogenous elasticity and utility: We show that this test is also too lax.

Overconfidence and Prejudice

Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi, and Philipp Strack

We develop a model of multi-dimensional misspecified learning in which an overconfident agent learns about groups in society from observations of his and others’ successes. We show that the average person sees his group relative to other groups too positively, and this in-group bias exhibits systematic comparative-statics patterns. First, a person is most likely to have negative opinions about other groups he competes with. Second, while information about another group’s achievements does not lower a person’s prejudice, information about economic or social forces affecting the group can, and personal contact with group members has a beneficial effect that is larger than in classical settings.

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How do currencies become international?

Bahaj & Reis(@R2Rsquared) show that PBoC swap lines boosted RMB use abroad, revealing a policy lever to jumpstart a currency’s international status.

https://www.restud.com/jumpstarting-an-international-currency/

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Editorial update:
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich @gchodorowreich (Harvard University) has stepped down as a Foreign Editor of The Review of Economic Studies. We are grateful to Gabe for his excellent service and contributions to the journal and the REStud Tour.

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"Capital flowed to high-inflation countries during recent surge, worsening the output-inflation tradeoff. Reversing flows would have reduced volatility & tightening needs."

New paper by @LouphouC & Bengui:

https://www.restud.com/destabilizing-capital-flows-amid-global-inflation/

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Announcement📢:

We are pleased to welcome @andreamoro (Vanderbilt University) as our new Data Editor, effective 1 January 2026. We look forward to collaborating with him in this new role.

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