The Review of Economic Studies is one of the core journals in economics. It is essential reading for economists, consistently ranking among the top five journals.

Criminal groups govern millions worldwide. Even in strong states, gangs resolve disputes and provide security. Why do these duopolies of coercion emerge? Often, gangs fill vacuums of official power, suggesting that increasing state presence should crowd out criminal governance. We show, however, that state and gang rule are sometimes complements. In particular, gangs could minimize seizures and arrests by keeping neighborhoods orderly and loyal.

We study behavioral responses to personal wealth taxes in Colombia. We utilize tax microdata from 1993 to 2016 linked with the leaked Panama Papers to investigate offshoring to the country’s key tax havens. We leverage variation from discrete jumps in tax liability and four major reforms to the wealth tax system, including changes in tax rates and duration, using bunching and difference-in-difference techniques. We find compelling evidence that taxpayers instantly reduce the wealth they declare in response to a wealth tax.

We study the distributional effects of asset ownership on price informativeness in a general equilibrium model. The model features investors (oligopolists) with different degrees of price impact and abilities to learn about individual asset payoffs from private and price signals, and a competitive fringe that only learns from asset prices. We show that price informativeness is non-monotonic in the oligopolists’ aggregate size, decreasing in the sector’s concentration and in the size of the passive sector.

This paper shows that the outcome of trade wars for tariffs and welfare will be affected by the monetary policy regime. The key message is that trade policy interacts with monetary policy in a way that magnifies the welfare costs of discretionary monetary policy in an international setting. If countries follow monetary policies of flexible inflation targeting, trade wars are relatively mild, with low equilibrium tariffs and small welfare costs.

As utility services expand throughout the developing world, providers must grapple with how to set prices to recover average costs. Data from a multi-year randomized pricing experiment among nearly 1500 recently-connected piped water customers in Vietnam reveal month-to-month demand persistence. Based on structural demand estimation, we document how endogenous preferences, if unaccounted for, can lead to low take-up and thereby threaten the financial viability of the new water utility.

I build a macroeconomic model that features chronic excess capacity. Firms can use capacity to compete for buyers who are not fully attentive to prices. If one firm expands capacity while other firms do not, it “steals” or attracts profitable demand from others. Theoretically, I show that this capacity competition can cause an over-accumulation of capacity. In the presence of chronic excess capacity, capital resources can be slack, and demand shocks can have large effects on output.