Accepted Papers

The Review of Economic Studies is one of the most highly respected academic journals in the field of economics. It is known for publishing leading research in all areas of economics, from microeconomics to macroeconomics. The journal is published by the Oxford University Press.

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Pseudo Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer

A collective choice problem specifies a finite set of alternatives from which a group of expected utility maximizers must choose. We associate a collective pseudo market with every collective choice problem and establish the existence and efficiency of pseudo Lindahl equilibrium (PLE) allocations. We also associate a cooperative bargaining problem with every collective choice problem and define a set-valued solution concept, the ω-weighted Nash bargaining set where ω is a vector of welfare weights. We provide axioms that characterize the ω-weighted Nash bargaining set.

New

Surviving Childhood: Effects of Removing a Child From Home

Ronja Helénsdotter

This paper studies the effects of the court-ordered removal of children from home on health, crime, and education. To isolate causal effects, I exploit quasi-random variation in judge assignment together with across-judge variation in the tendency to favor removal in an instrumental variable (IV) design. Using a novel data set (N=26,579) based on Swedish court documents that I transcribe and link with detailed register data, I find that court-ordered out-of-home placement has large adverse effects on the mortality of the marginal child.

New

Good Dispersion, Bad Dispersion

Matthias Kehrig and Nicolas Vincent

We document that most dispersion in marginal revenue products of inputs occurs across plants within firms rather than between firms. This is commonly thought to reflect misallocation: dispersion is “bad.” However, we show that eliminating frictions hampering internal capital markets in a multi-plant firm model may in fact increase productivity dispersion and raise output: dispersion can be “good.” This arises as firms optimally stagger investment activity across their plants over time to avoid raising costly external finance, instead relying on reallocating internal funds.

New

Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information

Francesco Celentano and Mark Rempel

How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs’ persistent private information and reduce firms’ public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cash flows. Equilibrium financing is driven by information rent differentials in CEO compensation. We validate and structurally estimate the model using firm listing and CEO compensation data.

New

Hiring as Exploration

Danielle Li, Lindsey Raymond, and Peter Bergman

This paper views hiring as a contextual bandit problem: to find the best workers over time, firms must balance “exploitation” (selecting from groups with proven track records) with “exploration” (selecting from under-represented groups to learn about quality). Yet modern hiring algorithms, based on supervised learning approaches, are designed solely for exploitation. Instead, we build a resume screening algorithm that values exploration by evaluating candidates according to their statistical upside potential.

New

Complexity and Satisficing: Theory with Evidence from Chess

Yuval Salant and Jörg L. Spenkuch

We develop a satisficing model of choice in which the available alternatives differ in their inherent complexity. We assume—and experimentally validate—that complexity leads to errors in the perception of alternatives’ values. The model yields sharp predictions about the effect of complexity on choice probabilities, some of which qualitatively contrast with those of maximization-based choice models.

New

Extreme Categories and Overreaction to News

Spencer Kwon and Johnny Tang

What characteristics of news generate over-or-underreaction? We study the asset-pricing consequences of diagnostic expectations, a model of belief formation based on the representativeness heuristic, in a setting where news events are drawn from categories with extreme distributions of fundamentals. Our model predicts greater over-reaction to news belonging to categories with more extreme outliers, or tail events. We test our theory on a comprehensive database of corporate news that includes news from 24 different categories, including earnings announcements, product launches, M&A, business expansions, and client-related news.

New

Racial Discrimination and the Social Contract: Evidence from U.S. Army Enlistment during WWII

Nancy Qian and Marco Tabellini

This paper documents that the Pearl Harbor attack triggered a sharp increase in volunteer enlistment rates of American men, the magnitude of the increase was smaller for Black men than for white men and the Black-white gap was larger in counties with higher levels of racial discrimination. The results suggest that political exclusion and discrimination can undermine support for the government during critical times such as war.

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Recently accepted to #REStud, "Revisiting the Non-Parametric Analysis of Time-Inconsistent Preferences," from Echenique and Tserenjigmid:

https://www.restud.com/revisiting-the-non-parametric-analysis-of-time-inconsistent-preferences/

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Recently accepted to #REStud, "Overconfidence and Prejudice," from Heidhues, Kőszegi and Strack:

https://www.restud.com/overconfidence-and-prejudice/

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"Can communities sustain cooperation when players can add or erase signals from their records?
Sufficiently long-lived players can hardly sustain any cooperation, but players w/ intermediate lifespans can sustain some cooperation."

From @harry_toulouse:

https://www.restud.com/community-enforcement-with-endogenous-records/

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Recently accepted to #REStud, "Behavioral Causal Inference," from Ran Spiegler:

https://www.restud.com/behavioral-causal-inference/

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