Accepted Papers

The Review of Economic Studies is one of the most highly respected academic journals in the field of economics. It is known for publishing leading research in all areas of economics, from microeconomics to macroeconomics. The journal is published by the Oxford University Press.

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Inefficient Automation

Martin Beraja and Nathan Zorzi

How should the government respond to automation? We study this question in a heterogeneous agent model that takes worker displacement seriously. We recognize that displaced workers face two frictions in practice: reallocation is slow and borrowing is limited. We analyze a second best problem where the government can tax automation but lacks redistributive tools to fully alleviate borrowing frictions. The equilibrium is (constrained) inefficient and automation is excessive.

Robust Implementation with Costly Information

Harry Pei and Bruno Strulovici

We construct mechanisms that can robustly implement any desired social choice function when (i) agents may incur a cost to learn the state of the world, (ii) with small probability, agents’ preferences can be arbitrarily different from some baseline known to the mechanism designer, and (iii) the mechanism designer does not know agents’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another’s preferences. The mechanisms we propose have a natural interpretation and do not require the mechanism designer to be able to verify the state ex post.

Labor Market Screening and the Design of Social Insurance: An Equilibrium Analysis of the Labor Market for the Disabled

Naoki Aizawa, Soojin Kim, and Serena Rhee

This paper studies how firms’ screening incentives in the labor market affect the optimal design of social insurance programs and quantitatively assesses the U.S. disability policies accounting for firms’ screening of the disabled. We develop an equilibrium search model where workers with different productivities have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage benefits and firms cannot offer an employment contract that explicitly depends on worker types.

Optimal Allocation via Waitlists: Simplicity through Information Design

Itai Ashlagi, Faidra Monachou, and Afshin Nikzad

We study nonmonetary markets where objects that arrive over time are allocated to unitdemand agents with private types, such as in the allocation of public housing or deceased-donor organs. An agent’s value for an object is supermodular in her type and the object quality, and her payoff is her value minus her waiting cost. The social planner’s objective is a weighted sum of allocative efficiency (i.e., the sum of values) and welfare (i.e., the sum of payoffs).

The Climate in Climate Economics

Doris Folini, Aleksandra Friedl, Felix Kübler, and Simon Scheidegger

To analyze climate change mitigation strategies, economists rely on simplified climate models — so-called climate emulators — that provide a realistic quantitative link between CO2 emissions and global warming at low computational costs. In this paper, we propose a generic and transparent calibration and evaluation strategy for these climate emulators that is based on freely and easily accessible state-of-the-art benchmark data from climate sciences. We demonstrate that the appropriate choice of the free model parameters can be of key relevance for the predicted social cost of carbon.

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