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The Review of Economic Studies is one of the most highly respected academic journals in the field of economics. It is known for publishing leading research in all areas of economics, from microeconomics to macroeconomics. The journal is published by the Oxford University Press.

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Should We Prevent Off-Label Drug Prescriptions? Empirical Evidence from France

27 May 2024

Tuba Tuncel

After a drug obtains marketing authorization, the usage depends on the regulation of off-label prescriptions for unapproved indications. We investigate the impact of off-label prescription regulation on physicians’ behavior, patients’ health, treatment costs, and pharmaceutical firms’ pricing with a structural demand and supply model. Exploiting rich panel data on physicians’ activities and office visits in France over nine years, we use a model of prescription choice and health outcomes with unobserved patient-level heterogeneity. We identify the demand for on-label and off-label drugs and the effect of prescription choice on health outcomes.

Inflation Levels and (In)Attention

27 May 2024

Anat Bracha and Jenny Tang

Inflation expectations are key determinants of economic activity and are central to the current policy debate about whether inflation expectations will remain anchored in the face of recent pandemic-related increases in inflation. This paper explores evidence of inattention by constructing two novel and direct measures of consumers’ inattention, and documents greater attention when inflation is high.

Reputational Bargaining with External Resolution Opportunities

27 May 2024

Mehmet Ekmekci and Hanzhe Zhang

Two parties negotiate in the presence of external resolution opportunities (e.g., court, arbitration, or war). The outcome of external resolution depends on the privately held justifiability/strength of their claims. A justified party issues an ultimatum for resolution whenever possible, but an unjustified party strategically bluffs with an ultimatum to establish a reputation for being justified. We show that the availability of external resolution opportunities can benefit or hurt an unjustified party in equilibrium.

Survey data and subjective beliefs in business cycle models

20 May 2024

Anmol Bhandari, Jaroslav Borovička, and Paul Ho

This paper develops a theory of subjective beliefs that departs from rational expectations, and shows that biases in household beliefs have quantitatively large effects on macroeconomic aggregates. The departures are formalized using model-consistent notions of pessimism and optimism which are supported by extensive time-series and cross-sectional evidence from household surveys. The role subjective beliefs play in aggregate fluctuations is quantified in a business cycle model with goods and labor market frictions. Consistent with the survey evidence, an increase in pessimism generates upward biases in unemployment and inflation forecasts and lowers economic activity.

Expectations and Learning from Prices

20 May 2024

Francesca Bastianello and Paul Fontanier

We study mislearning from equilibrium prices, and contrast this with mislearning from exogenous fundamentals. We micro-found mislearning from prices with a psychologically founded theory of “Partial Equilibrium Thinking” (PET), where traders learn fundamental information from prices, but fail to realize others do so too. PET leads to over-reaction, and upward sloping demand curves, thus contributing to more inelastic markets. The degree of individual-level over-reaction, and the extent of inelasticity varies with the composition of traders, and with the informativeness of new information.

Motivated Skepticism

20 May 2024

Jeanne Hagenbach and Charlotte Saucet

We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Compared to neutral settings, skepticism is significantly lower when it is self-threatening, and not enhanced when it is self-serving. These results shed light on a new channel that individuals can use to protect their beliefs in communication situations: they exercise skepticism in a motivated way, that is, in a way that depends on the desirability of the conclusions that skeptical inferences lead to.

Who Are the Hand-to-Mouth?

20 May 2024

Mark Aguiar, Mark Bils, and Corina Boar

Many households hold little wealth. In standard precautionary savings models these households should not only display higher marginal propensities to consume (MPCs), but also higher future consumption growth. In contrast, we see from the PSID that such “hand-to-mouth” households do not display higher growth in spending. They also exhibit greater volatility of spending and adjust their spending to a greater extent through the number of categories consumed. Consistent with a role for preference heterogeneity, the panel data show that it is persistent differences across households, not current assets, that predict low consumption growth and other spending differences for the hand-to-mouth households.

Market Structure and Extortion: Evidence from 50,000 Extortion Payments

20 May 2024

Zach Brown, Eduardo Montero, Carlos Schmidt-Padilla, and Maria Micaela Sviatschi

How does gang competition affect extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a leading wholesale distributor of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals in El Salvador, we document evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers. We exploit a 2016 nonaggression pact between gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the pact led to a large reduction in competition and violence, we find that it increased the amount paid in extortion by approximately 20%.

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The Review was founded in 1933 by a group of Economists from leading UK and US departments. It is now managed by European-based economists.

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