The Review of Economic Studies is one of the core journals in economics. It is essential reading for economists, consistently ranking among the top five journals.

How does an increase in market size, say due to globalization, affect welfare? We study this question using a model with monopolistic competition, heterogeneous markups, and fixed costs. We characterize changes in welfare and decompose changes in allocative efficiency into three different effects.

We use novel, large-scale data on 17.5 million Americans to study how a policy-driven increase in economic resources affects children’s long-term outcomes. Using the 2000 Census and 2001-2013 American Community Survey linked to the Social Security Administration’s NUMIDENT, we leverage the county-level roll-out of the Food Stamps program between 1961 and 1975.

The FDIC resolves insolvent banks with scoring auctions. Although the structure of the scoring rule is known to bidders, they are uncertain about how the FDIC trades off different bid components. Scoring-rule uncertainty motivates bidders to submit multiple bids for the same failed bank.

In the late nineteenth century, the North American bison was brought to the brink of extinction in just over a decade. We demonstrate that the loss of the bison had immediate, negative consequences for the Native Americans who relied on them and ultimately resulted in a permanent reversal of fortunes. Once amongst the tallest people in the world, the generations of bison-reliant people born after the slaughter lost their entire height advantage.

We propose a theory that analyzes how a workers’ asset holdings affect their job productivity. In a labor market with uninsurable risk, workers choose to direct their job search trading off productivity and wages against unemployment risk. Workers with low asset holdings have a precautionary job search motive, they direct their search to low productivity jobs because those offer a low risk at the cost of low productivity and a low wage.

We study how perceptions of corporate responsibility influence policy preferences and the effectiveness of corporate communication when agents have imperfect memory recall. Using a new large-scale survey of U.S. citizens on their support for corporate bailouts, we first establish that the public demands corporations to behave better within society, a sentiment we label “big business discontent.”