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Assessing racial and educational segmentation in large marriage markets

Edoardo Ciscato

Complementarities between partners’ characteristics are often held responsible for the patterns of assortative mating observed in marriage markets along different dimensions, such as race and education. However, when the marriage market is segmented into racially and educationally homogeneous clusters, people naturally have more match opportunities with their likes. In this paper, we build an empirically tractable dynamic matching model with endogenous separation and remarriage. In every period, agents participate in a competitive assignment game in the vein of Choo and Siow (2006), where mating strategies depend on both the expected match gains and search frictions in the form of meeting costs.

The Long-Run Labor Market Effects of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement

Brian K. Kovak and Peter M. Morrow

This paper assesses the long-run effects of the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) on the Canadian labor market using matched longitudinal administrative data for the years 1984-2004. We simultaneously examine the labor market effects of increased export expansion and import competition, generally finding adverse effects of Canadian tariff cuts and favorable effects of U.S. cuts, though both effects are small. Workers initially employed in industries that experienced larger Canadian tariff concessions exhibit a heightened probability of layoffs at large firms, but little impact on long-run cumulative earnings.

Consumer Surplus of Alternative Payment Methods

Fernando Alvarez and David Argente

This paper estimates the consumer surplus from using alternative payment methods. We use evidence from Uber rides in Mexico, where riders have the option to use cash or cards to pay for rides. We design and conduct three large-scale field experiments, which involved approximately 400,000 riders. We also build a structural model which, disciplined by our new experimental data, allows us to estimate the loss of private benefits for riders when a ban on cash payments is implemented.

Fines and Financial Wellbeing

Steven Mello

While survey evidence suggests widespread financial fragility in the U.S., causal evidence on the implications of typical, negative income shocks is scarce. I estimate the impact of speeding fines on household finances using administrative traffic citation records and a panel of credit reports. Event studies reveal that fines averaging $195 are associated with a $34 increase in unpaid bills in collections. Given additional evidence that fine payment explains this effect and that default is the “last resort” for households, I interpret this finding as suggesting rates of inability to meet unplanned expenses which are consistent with the survey evidence.

The Economics of Financial Stress

Dmitriy Sergeyev, Chen Lian, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko

We study the psychological costs of financial constraints and their economic consequences. Using a representative survey of U.S. households, we document the prevalence of financial stress in U.S. households and a strong relationship between financial stress and measures of financial constraints. We incorporate financial stress into an otherwise standard dynamic model of consumption and labor supply. We emphasize two key results. First, both financial stress itself and naivete about financial stress are important components of a psychology-based theory of the poverty trap.

Electoral Turnovers

Benjamin Marx, Vincent Pons, and Vincent Rollet

In most national elections, voters face a key choice between continuity and change. Electoral turnovers occur when the incumbent candidate or party fails to win reelection. To understand how turnovers affect national outcomes, we study all presidential and parliamentary elections held globally between 1946 and 2018. We document the prevalence of turnovers over time and estimate their effects on economic performance, human development, and the quality of democracy.

A Dynamic Model of Authoritarian Social Control

Roger Lagunoff

Authoritarian regimes often use targeted social control – unequal application of the law to limit expressive freedom and enforce social conformity. At the same time, their methods appear less draconian than in the past. In this model, an authority structures punishments and rewards to compel adherence to its preferred norm. The authority’s commitment is time-limited and depends on imperfectly informative signals of a citizen’s behavior. Given two citizens with the same observed behavior, the authority imposes harsher punishments on the poorer and/or ex ante dissident individual.

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The official account of the Review of Economic Studies, one of the world's top economics journals.

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"Firm exits can trigger cascades of shutdown. New work studies how these cascades propagate and their impact on aggregate fluctuations."

Recently accepted to #REStud, from Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel @mathtd:

https://www.restud.com/cascades-and-fluctuations-in-an-economy-with-an-endogenous-production-network/

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I'm so fortunate that this paper got published in such a good journal.

I hope that it can be a helpful guide for future researchers who want to work at the intersection of economics and genetics and estimate Gene-Environment interplay #GxE

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This paper started with data. We were convinced that the discrepancy between book and market values of banks was key to understanding the data. We then developed a theory where, with a simple model, only one state variable driving Tobin's Q, you can explain several data moments.

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