NewIdentification Of Time-Inconsistent Models: The Case Of Insecticide Treated Nets 20 February 2026 Aprajit Mahajan, Christian Michel, and Alessandro TarozziTime-inconsistency may play a central role in explaining inter-temporal behavior, particularly among poor households. However, little is known about the distribution of time-inconsistent agents, and time-preference parameters are typically not identified in standard dynamic choice models. We formulate a dynamic discrete choice model in an unobservedly heterogeneous population of possibly time-inconsistent agents.
NewCoarse Bayesian Updating 13 February 2026 Alexander M. JakobsenStudies have shown that the standard law of belief updating—Bayes’ rule—is descriptively invalid in various settings. In this paper, I introduce and analyze a generalization of Bayes’ rule—Coarse Bayesian updating—accommodating much of the empirical evidence. I characterize the model axiomatically, show how it generates several well-known biases, and derive its main implications in static and dynamic settings.
NewDecision Theory for Treatment Choice Problems with Partial Identification 9 February 2026 José Luis Montiel Olea, Chen Qiu, and Jörg StoyeWe apply classical statistical decision theory to a large class of treatment choice problems with partial identification. We show that, in a general class of problems with Gaussian likelihood, all decision rules are admissible; it is maximin-welfare optimal to ignore all data; and, for severe enough partial identification, there are infinitely many minimax-regret optimal decision rules, all of which sometimes randomize the policy recommendation.
NewNarratives about the Macroeconomy 9 February 2026 Peter Andre, Ingar Haaland, Christopher Roth, Mirko Wiederholt, and Johannes WohlfartWe study narratives about the macroeconomy—the stories people tell to explain macroeconomic phenomena—in the context of a historic surge in inflation. In our empirical analysis, we field surveys with more than 10,000 US households and 100 academic experts, measure economic narratives in open-ended questions, and represent them as Directed Acyclic Graphs.
NewDynamic Regulation with Firm Linkages: Evidence from Texas 26 January 2026 Matthew Leisten and Nicholas VreugdenhilWe evaluate the efficiency of dynamic linked environmental regulation. Linked regulation allows inspectors who uncover violations at one plant to increase future enforcement at other plants that share a common owner. When compliance costs are correlated, regulators can then target scarce enforcement resources towards bad actors without inspecting everyone.
NewDo The Effects of Nudges Persist? Theory and Evidence from 38 Natural Field Experiments 26 January 2026 Alec Brandon, Paul Ferraro, John A. List, Robert D. Metcalfe, Michael K. Price, and Florian RundhammerWe formalize a research design to uncover the mechanisms underlying long-term reductions in energy consumption caused by a widely implemented nudge. We consider two channels: technology adoption and habit formation. Using data from 38 natural field experiments, we isolate the role of technology adoption by comparing treatment and control homes after the initial resident moves, which discontinues the treatment for a home.
NewInvesting in influence: Investors, portfolio firms, and political giving 18 January 2026 Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, Francesco Trebbi, and Eyub YegenWe examine how the rise of institutional ownership has influenced firms’ political activities. We find that, after the acquisition of a large stake, a firm’s political action committee giving mirrors more closely that of the acquiring investor. Consistent with a causal interpretation, this pattern is also observed for acquisitions driven by new index inclusions.
NewOrganizational Change and Reference Dependent Preferences 18 January 2026 Klaus M. Schmidt and Jonas von WangenheimReference-dependent preferences can explain several puzzling observations about organizational change. We introduce a dynamic model in which a firm bargains with loss-averse workers about organizational change and wages. We show that change is often stagnant or slow for many periods, followed by a sudden boost in productivity triggered by a crisis.
