NewCatastrophes, delays, and learning 22 March 2026 Matti Liski and François SalaniéWe propose a simple and general model of experimentation in which reaching untried levels of a stock variable may, after a stochastic delay, lead to a catastrophe. Hence, at any point in time a catastrophe might well be under way, due to past experiments. We show how to measure this legacy of the past from prior beliefs and the chronicle of stock levels.
NewQuantifying supply-side climate policies 22 March 2026 Lassi Ahlvik, Jørgen Juel Andersen, Jonas Hveding Hamang, and Torfinn HardingWhat are the effects of supply-side climate policies in the oil market? We use global company-level data to estimate the impact of 84 reforms of production taxes between 2000 and 2019 on oil production, exploration, and discoveries. We find that higher taxes primarily reduce companies’ exploration expenditures and oil discoveries, and also reduce short-term production of unconventional oil.
NewNormal Approximation in Large Network Models 15 March 2026 Michael Leung and Hyungsik Roger MoonWe prove a central limit theorem for network formation models with strategic interactions and homophilous agents. Since data often consists of observations on a single large network, we consider an asymptotic framework in which the network size diverges. We argue that a modification of “stabilization” conditions from the literature on geometric graphs provides a useful high-level formulation of weak dependence which we utilize to establish an abstract central limit theorem.
NewUnpacking Aggregate Welfare in a Spatial Economy 15 March 2026 Eric Donald, Masao Fukui, and Yuhei MiyauchiHow do regional productivity shocks or transportation infrastructure improvements affect aggregate welfare? In a general class of spatial equilibrium models, we provide a formula for aggregate welfare changes, decomposed into terms associated with (i) technology (Fogel 1964, Hulten 1978), (ii) spatial dispersion of marginal utility, (iii) fiscal externalities, (iv) technological externalities, and (v) redistribution.
NewDe Gustibus and Disputes about Reference Dependence 15 March 2026 Pol Campos-Mercade, Lorenz Goette, Thomas Graeber, Alexandre Kellogg, and Charles SprengerExisting tests of reference-dependent preferences assume universal loss aversion. This paper examines the implications of heterogeneity in gain-loss attitudes for such tests. In experiments on labor supply and exchange behavior, we first measure gain-loss attitudes and then study a canonical treatment effect that distinguishes different models of reference dependence.
NewShould monetary policy care about redistribution? Optimal monetary and fiscal policy with heterogeneous agents 6 March 2026 François Le Grand, Alaïs Martin-Baillon, and Xavier RagotWe present a method to determine optimal monetary policy in heterogeneous-agent economies with nominal frictions and aggregate shocks, under various assumptions regarding fiscal policy. We analyze models with either sticky prices or sticky wages. In the sticky-price economy, when fiscal policy is optimally set, optimal monetary policy implements price stability.
NewGendered Spheres of Learning and Household Decision-Making over Fertility 6 March 2026 Nava Ashraf, Maxim Bakhtin, Erica Field, Alessandra Voena, and Roberta ZiparoWhile men and women make joint decisions about fertility, women give birth and are more likely to learn about a significant cost of childbearing—maternal health risk. Within couples in Zambia, men have systematically lower awareness of maternal risk factors and higher desire for children than their wives. We develop a model in which information asymmetries between partners over maternal health risk can persist in equilibrium due to strategic incentives and can generate disagreement over fertility that cannot be resolved with transfers.
NewOptimal Decision Rules when Payoffs are Partially Identified 20 February 2026 Timothy Christensen, Hyungsik Roger Moon, and Frank SchorfheideWe derive asymptotically optimal statistical decision rules for discrete choice problems when payoffs depend on a partially-identified parameter θ and the decision maker can use a point-identified parameter µ to deduce restrictions on θ. Examples include treatment choice under partial identification and pricing with rich unobserved heterogeneity.
