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Capital Requirements with Non-Bank Finance

Kyle Dempsey

I quantitatively analyze the macroeconomic impacts of raising capital requirements in a model in which heterogeneous firms may choose either intermediated or direct finance. Heterogeneous banks compete with other banks and the bond market, fund loans with insured deposits and costly equity (subject to a minimum capital to asset ratio), and monitor borrowers. I find that tighter capital requirements reduce costly bank failures while having only small effects on key macroeconomic aggregates, and that raising capital requirements above current levels can be welfare-improving.

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The Micro and Macro Effects of Changes in the Potential Benefit Duration

Jonas Jessen, Robin Jessen, Ewa Gałecka-Burdziak, Marek Góra, and Jochen Kluve

We quantify micro and macro effects of changes in the potential benefit duration (PBD) in unemployment insurance. In Poland, the PBD is 12 months for the newly unemployed if the previous year’s county unemployment rate is more than 150% of the national average, and 6 months otherwise. We exploit this cut-off using regression discontinuity estimates on registry data containing the universe of unemployed from 2005 to 2019.

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Does Tax-Benefit Linkage Matter for the Incidence of Payroll Taxes?

Antoine Bozio, Thomas Breda, Julien Grenet, and Arthur Guillouzouic

We analyze earnings responses to six large payroll tax and income tax reforms in France. Our findings indicate full pass-through to workers when there is a strong and transparent link between contributions and expected benefits. In contrast, employer payroll taxes with no tax-benefit linkage exhibit limited pass-through to workers, while income tax nominally borne by employees show nearly full pass-through.

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A Tale of Two Networks: Common Ownership and Product Market Rivalry

Florian Ederer and Bruno Pellegrino

We study the welfare implications of the rise of common ownership in the United States from 1995 to 2021. We build a general equilibrium model with a hedonic demand system in which firms compete in a network game of oligopoly. Firms are connected through two large networks: the first reflects ownership overlap, the second product market rivalry. In our model, common ownership of competing firms induces unilateral incentives to soften competition and the magnitude of the common ownership effect depends on how much the two networks overlap.

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Counterfactual Identification and Latent Space Enumeration in Discrete Outcome Models

Jiaying Gu, Thomas M. Russell, and Thomas Stringham

This paper provides a unified framework for studying the identification of counterfactual parameters in a general class of discrete outcome models, allowing for endogenous regressors and multidimensional latent variables, all without parametric distributional assumptions. Our main theoretical result is that, when the covariates are discrete, the infinite-dimensional latent variable distribution can be replaced with a finite-dimensional version that is equivalent from an identification perspective.

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Quantifying the Benefits of Labor Mobility in a Currency Union

Christopher L. House, Christian Proebsting, and Linda L. Tesar

Unemployment differentials are greater between countries in the euro area than between U.S. states. In both regions, net migration responds to unemployment differentials, though the response is smaller in the euro area compared to the United States. We use a multi-country DSGE model with cross-border migration to quantify Mundell’s hypothesis that labor mobility could substitute for independent monetary policy in a currency union.

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Bargaining Foundations for the Outside Option Principle

Dilip Abreu and Mihai Manea

We study a bargaining game in which a seller can trade with one of two buyers, who have values h and l (h > l). The outside option principle (OOP) predicts that the seller trades with the high-value buyer with probability converging to 1 at a price converging to max(h/2, l) as players become patient. While this prediction is supported by the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), a wide range of trading outcomes may emerge in subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs): in the patient limit, the seller can obtain any price in the interval [h/2, h] (and no other); moreover, allocative inefficiency and costly delay are possible.

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Chris Cronin's recent Review of Economic Studies (@RevEconStudies) article, "What Good Are Treatment Effects Without Treatment? Mental Health and the Reluctance to Use Talk Therapy," with Forsstrom and Papageorge, is one of their "featured" articles.

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Recently accepted to #REStud, "Overconfidence and Prejudice," from Heidhues, Kőszegi and Strack:

https://www.restud.com/overconfidence-and-prejudice/

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"Can communities sustain cooperation when players can add or erase signals from their records?
Sufficiently long-lived players can hardly sustain any cooperation, but players w/ intermediate lifespans can sustain some cooperation."

From @harry_toulouse:

https://www.restud.com/community-enforcement-with-endogenous-records/

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Recently accepted to #REStud, "Behavioral Causal Inference," from Ran Spiegler:

https://www.restud.com/behavioral-causal-inference/

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