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On the optimal design of a Financial Stability Fund

Árpád Ábraham, Eva Carceles-Poveda, Yan Liu, and Ramon Marimon

We develop a model of a Financial Stability Fund (the ‘Fund’ henceforth) for a union of sovereign countries. By design, the contract prevents country defaults, as well as undesired expected losses, which in a union translate into excessive risk mutualizations. A participant country has greater ability to borrow and share risks than using sovereign debt financing. The Fund contract also provides better incentives for the country to reduce endogenous risks. These efficiency gains arise from the ability of the Fund to offer long-term contingent financial contracts, subject to limited enforcement (LE) and moral hazard (MH) constraints.

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Globalization and the Ladder of Development: Pushed to the Top or Held at the Bottom?

David Atkin, Arnaud Costinot, and Masao Fukui

We study the relationship between international trade and development in a model where countries differ in their capability, goods differ in their complexity, and capability growth is a function of a country’s pattern of specialization. Theoretically, we show that it is possible for international trade to increase capability growth in all countries and, in turn, to push all countries up the development ladder. This occurs if (i) shifting employment towards more complex sectors raises capability growth and if (ii) foreign competition is tougher in less complex sectors for all countries.

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A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts

Francesc Dilmé and Daniel F. Garrett

A seller with commitment power sets prices over time. Risk-averse buyers arrive to the market and decide when to purchase. We show that it is optimal for the seller to choose a constant high price punctuated by occasional episodes of sequential discounts that occur at random times. This optimal price path has the property that the price a buyer ends up paying is independent of his arrival and purchase times, and only depends on his valuation.

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Brokering Votes with Information Spread Via Social Networks

Raul Duarte, Frederico Finan, Horacio Larreguy, and Laura Schechter

Politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes throughout much of the developing world. We investigate how social networks facilitate these vote-buying exchanges. Our conceptual framework suggests brokers should be particularly well-placed within the network to learn about non-copartisans’ reciprocity in order to target transfers effectively. As a result, parties should recruit brokers who are central among non-copartisans.

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The impact of EITC on education, labor market trajectories, and inequalities

Albertini Julien, Arthur Poirier, and Anthony Terriau

As a complement to the federal earned income tax credit (EITC), some states offer their own EITC, typically calculated as a percentage of the federal EITC. In this paper, we analyze the effect of state EITC on education using policy discontinuities at US state borders. Our estimates reveal that an increase in the state EITC leads to a statistically significant increase in the high school dropout rate.

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A Walrasian Mechanism with Markups for Nonconvex Markets

Paul Milgrom and Mitchell Watt

We introduce markup equilibrium—an extension of Walrasian equilibrium in which consumers pay a fixed percentage markup over producer prices. In quasilinear markets, markup equilibria exist despite non-convexities. They are resource-feasible and envy-free, incur no budget deficit, and require little more communication and computation than ordinary Walrasian equilibrium. The associated markup mechanism is asymptotically incentive-compatible.

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The Effect of Provider Diversity on Racial Health Disparities: Evidence from the Military

Michael Frakes and Jonathan Gruber

We assess the relationship between the racial diversity of medical providers and racial health disparities in the use of preventive care and in patient outcomes. We use unique data from the Military Health System, where we observe providers as patients so that we can identify their race, and where moves across bases change exposure to provider race in a plausibly exogenous fashion.

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The official account of the Review of Economic Studies, one of the world's top economics journals.

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We are pleased to introduce Niels Gormsen (@NielsGormsen), Copenhagen Business School & University of Chicago, as a new member of the Editorial Board of REStud. His outstanding expertise will help us continue to publish pioneering economic research.
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Welcome aboard! Jose Vasquez (@jpvasq), London School of Economics, has joined the Editorial Board of The Review of Economic Studies. We are grateful to have his expertise supporting our mission.
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We are thrilled to announce that Ro’ee Levy (@RoeeLevyZ), Tel Aviv University School of Economics, is joining the Editorial Board of The Review of Economic Studies. We look forward to his valuable contributions to the journal’s future.
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Exciting news: Dávid Nagy, CREI, has joined the Editorial Board of The Review of Economic Studies. His deep knowledge will help guide the journal’s editorial process.
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