Dynamic Asset-Backed Security Design

Emre Ozdenoren, London Business School, CEPR, Kathy Yuan, London School of Economics, FMG, CEPR, and Shengxing Zhang, London School of Economics, Peking University HSBC Business School, CEPR

Borrowers obtain liquidity by issuing securities backed by the current period payoff and resale price of a long-lived collateral asset, and they are privately informed about the payoff distribution. Asset price can be self-fulfilling: a higher asset price lowers adverse selection and allows borrowers to raise greater funding, which makes the asset more valuable, leading to multiple equilibria. Optimal security design eliminates multiple equilibria, improves welfare, and can be implemented as a repo contract. Persistent adverse selection lowers debt funding, generates volatility in asset prices and exacerbates credit crunches. The theory demonstrates the role of asset-backed securities on stability of market-based financial systems.