Skip to main content
The Review of Economic Studies
  • About
    • Editorial Board
    • Charitable activities and donations
    • History
    • Managing Editors
    • Code of conduct
    • Research code of conduct
  • Accepted Papers
  • Latest News
  • Submissions
  • Published Papers
  • Restud Tours

Accepted Papers

The Review of Economic Studies is one of the most highly respected academic journals in the field of economics. It is known for publishing leading research in all areas of economics, from microeconomics to macroeconomics. The journal is published by the Oxford University Press.

View published articles on Oxford University Press

Motives and Consequences of Libor Strategic Reporting: How Much Can We Learn from Banks’ Self-Reported Borrowing Rates?

14 January 2024

Pietro Bonaldi

Libor is an estimate of interbank borrowing costs computed daily from rates reported by a fixed panel of banks. Evidence suggests that banks have manipulated Libor in recent years by misreporting their borrowing costs. I estimate a strategic reporting model that identifies banks’ borrowing costs as well as their motives for misreporting. The estimation places a lower bound on the value that Libor would have had if banks had truthfully reported their borrowing costs.

Outside Options in the Labor Market

11 January 2024

Sydnee Caldwell and Oren Danieli

This paper develops a method to estimate workers’ outside employment opportunities. We outline a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity, from which we derive a sufficient statistic, the “outside options index” (OOI), for the effect of outside options on earnings, holding worker productivity constant. The OOI uses the cross-sectional concentration of similar workers across job types to quantify workers’ outside options as a function of workers’ commuting costs, preferences, and skills.

Revisiting Event Study Designs: Robust and Efficient Estimation

11 January 2024

Kirill Borusyak, Xavier Jaravel, and Jann Spiess

We develop a framework for difference-in-differences designs with staggered treatment adoption and heterogeneous causal effects. We show that conventional regression-based estimators fail to provide unbiased estimates of relevant estimands absent strong restrictions on treatment-effect homogeneity. We then derive the efficient estimator addressing this challenge, which takes an intuitive “imputation” form when treatment-effect heterogeneity is unrestricted. We characterize the asymptotic behavior of the estimator, propose tools for inference, and develop tests for identifying assumptions.

Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labor Courts

11 January 2024

Joyce Sadka, Enrique Seira, and Christopher Woodruff

Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use field experiments with ongoing cases to analyze sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labor court. We provide parties with personalized predictions for case outcomes and show that this information nearly doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration.

Granular Search, Market Structure, and Wages

11 January 2024

Gregor Jarosch, Jan Sebastian Nimczik, and Isaac Sorkin

We develop a model of size-based market power in a frictional labor market. In the canonical search environment, competition for workers is encoded in outside options. In our granular setting, large employers remove their own job postings from their workers’ outside option. Thus, size gives market power and a more concentrated market structure depresses wages because it reduces competition for workers.

Designing Interrogations

7 January 2024

Alessandro Ispano and Péter Vida

We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer’s evidence, which is informative about the suspect’s status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment.

Voluntary Disclosure in Asymmetric Contests

7 January 2024

Christian Ewerhart and Julia Lareida

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome.

Strategic Foundations of Efficient Rational Expectations

12 December 2023

Paulo Barelli, Srihari Govindan, and Robert Wilson

We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and whose private signals are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many traders partitioned into a finite set of symmetry classes called types. Market mechanisms in a class that includes auctions yield the same outcome as the Walrasian rational expectations equilibrium if and only if the efficient allocation has a monotonicity property. Examples illustrate cases where they differ. Monotonicity restricts the heterogeneity among traders’ types.

  • « Previous
  • 1
  • …
  • 26
  • 27
  • 28
  • 29
  • 30
  • …
  • 48
  • Next »

Follow us

The Review of Economic Studies Follow

The official account of the Review of Economic Studies, one of the world's top economics journals.

RevEconStudies

A new paper by @THEdanjlewis & Mertens makes the Stock-Yogo test for weak instruments with multiple HAC robust endogenous regressors, propose tests for bias in a single coefficients, and extend to test general rank deficiency in the first stage

https://www.restud.com/a-robust-test-for-weak-instruments-for-2sls-with-multiple-endogenous-regressors/

#EconX

Reply on Twitter 2001271443418423515 Retweet on Twitter 2001271443418423515 17 Like on Twitter 2001271443418423515 65 Twitter 2001271443418423515

New paper by @pilossopher, @davide_melc & Lewis estimates the distribution of spending responses to stimulus payments. MPCs are heterogeneous, with observables explaining 8% of the variation, highlighting the crucial role of latent heterogeneity

https://www.restud.com/latent-heterogeneity-in-the-marginal-propensity-to-consume/
#REStud

Reply on Twitter 1996503790581907923 Retweet on Twitter 1996503790581907923 20 Like on Twitter 1996503790581907923 80 Twitter 1996503790581907923

New paper, "Firm Quality Dynamics and the Slippery Slope of Credit Intervention" by @wenhaoli111 & Li shows that direct government and central bank lending can distort firm quality and fuel future interventions.

https://www.restud.com/firm-quality-dynamics-and-the-slippery-slope-of-credit-intervention/

#EconTwitter #REStud

Reply on Twitter 1994082299873231192 Retweet on Twitter 1994082299873231192 6 Like on Twitter 1994082299873231192 25 Twitter 1994082299873231192

"We show how opportunity costs, a core economic concept, can explain seemingly non-rational behaviour (like cyclical choices) within a preference-maximising framework."

New paper by @PaolaManzini, @MarcoMa75263273 & @ulkulev

#EconTwitter #REStud

https://www.restud.com/choice-and-opportunity-costs/

Reply on Twitter 1993605369310969935 Retweet on Twitter 1993605369310969935 19 Like on Twitter 1993605369310969935 63 Twitter 1993605369310969935
Load More
The Review of Economic Studies

The Review was founded in 1933 by a group of Economists from leading UK and US departments. It is now managed by European-based economists.

Read more

Contact details

Ann Law
Journal Manager
Editorial Office
The Review of Economic Studies
Email: ann.law @ restud.com

Submissions

To assist the Editorial Office in prompt processing of this high volume of papers authors are requested to follow these guidelines:

Submit a Paper

Subscriptions

Please visit our publisher, Oxford University Press for quotes on subscriptions.

Subscribe

  • Contact
  • Privacy Policy
  • Cookie Policy

©2024 The Review of Economic Studies Web Designers - KD Web

Follow us