Accepted Papers

The Review of Economic Studies is one of the most highly respected academic journals in the field of economics. It is known for publishing leading research in all areas of economics, from microeconomics to macroeconomics. The journal is published by the Oxford University Press.

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Reservation Raises: The Aggregate Labor Supply Curve at the Extensive Margin

Preston Mui and Benjamin Schoefer

We measure desired labor supply at the extensive (employment) margin in two representative surveys of the U.S. and German populations. We elicit reservation raises: the percent wage change that renders a given individual indifferent between employment and nonemployment. It is equal to her reservation wage divided by her actual, or potential, wage. The reservation raise distribution is the nonparametric aggregate labor supply curve.

Estimating Equilibrium in Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design under the ACA

Pietro Tebaldi

Regulations to design private yet publicly sponsored health insurance markets are increasingly adopted in many OECD countries. Here I combine data and economic theory to analyze the interaction between insurers’ competition and the design of premium subsidies in determining equilibrium outcomes. My empirical model includes adverse selection, rich heterogeneity in preferences for vertically and horizontally differentiated plans and accommodates alternative assumptions on pricing conduct.

The Causal Impact of Socio-Emotional Skills Training on Educational Success

Giuseppe Sorrenti, Ulf Zölitz, Denis Ribeaud, and Manuel Eisner

We study the long-term effects of a randomized intervention targeting children’s socio-emotional skills. The classroom-based intervention for primary school children has positive impacts that persist for over a decade. Treated children become more likely to complete academic high school and enroll in university. Two mechanisms drive these results.

Inefficient Automation

Martin Beraja and Nathan Zorzi

How should the government respond to automation? We study this question in a heterogeneous agent model that takes worker displacement seriously. We recognize that displaced workers face two frictions in practice: reallocation is slow and borrowing is limited. We analyze a second best problem where the government can tax automation but lacks redistributive tools to fully alleviate borrowing frictions. The equilibrium is (constrained) inefficient and automation is excessive.

Robust Implementation with Costly Information

Harry Pei and Bruno Strulovici

We construct mechanisms that can robustly implement any desired social choice function when (i) agents may incur a cost to learn the state of the world, (ii) with small probability, agents’ preferences can be arbitrarily different from some baseline known to the mechanism designer, and (iii) the mechanism designer does not know agents’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another’s preferences. The mechanisms we propose have a natural interpretation and do not require the mechanism designer to be able to verify the state ex post.

Labor Market Screening and the Design of Social Insurance: An Equilibrium Analysis of the Labor Market for the Disabled

Naoki Aizawa, Soojin Kim, and Serena Rhee

This paper studies how firms’ screening incentives in the labor market affect the optimal design of social insurance programs and quantitatively assesses the U.S. disability policies accounting for firms’ screening of the disabled. We develop an equilibrium search model where workers with different productivities have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage benefits and firms cannot offer an employment contract that explicitly depends on worker types.

Optimal Allocation via Waitlists: Simplicity through Information Design

Itai Ashlagi, Faidra Monachou, and Afshin Nikzad

We study nonmonetary markets where objects that arrive over time are allocated to unitdemand agents with private types, such as in the allocation of public housing or deceased-donor organs. An agent’s value for an object is supermodular in her type and the object quality, and her payoff is her value minus her waiting cost. The social planner’s objective is a weighted sum of allocative efficiency (i.e., the sum of values) and welfare (i.e., the sum of payoffs).

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