Accepted Papers

The Review of Economic Studies is one of the most highly respected academic journals in the field of economics. It is known for publishing leading research in all areas of economics, from microeconomics to macroeconomics. The journal is published by the Oxford University Press.

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Falling Interest Rates and Credit Reallocation: Lessons from General Equilibrium

Vladimir Asriyan, Luc Laeven, Alberto Martin, Alejandro Van der Ghote, and Victoria Vanasco

We show that in a canonical model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, financial frictions, and an imperfectly elastic supply of capital, a fall in the interest rate has an ambiguous effect on aggregate economic activity. In partial equilibrium, a lower interest rate raises aggregate investment both by relaxing financial constraints and by prompting relatively less productive entrepreneurs to invest. In general equilibrium, however, this higher demand for capital raises its price and crowds out investment by more productive entrepreneurs.

What Good are Treatment Effects without Treatment? Mental Health and the Reluctance to Use Talk Therapy

Christopher J. Cronin, Matthew P. Forsstrom, and Nicholas W. Papageorge

Evidence across disciplines suggests that talk therapy is more curative than antidepressants for mild-to-moderate depression and anxiety. Yet, few patients use it. We develop a dynamic choice model to analyze patient demand for the treatment of depression and anxiety. The model incorporates myriad potential impediments to therapy use along with links between mental health improvements and earnings. The estimated model reveals that mental health improvements are valuable, directly through utility and indirectly through earnings.

Should We Prevent Off-Label Drug Prescriptions? Empirical Evidence from France

Tuba Tuncel

After a drug obtains marketing authorization, the usage depends on the regulation of off-label prescriptions for unapproved indications. We investigate the impact of off-label prescription regulation on physicians’ behavior, patients’ health, treatment costs, and pharmaceutical firms’ pricing with a structural demand and supply model. Exploiting rich panel data on physicians’ activities and office visits in France over nine years, we use a model of prescription choice and health outcomes with unobserved patient-level heterogeneity. We identify the demand for on-label and off-label drugs and the effect of prescription choice on health outcomes.

Reputational Bargaining with External Resolution Opportunities

Mehmet Ekmekci and Hanzhe Zhang

Two parties negotiate in the presence of external resolution opportunities (e.g., court, arbitration, or war). The outcome of external resolution depends on the privately held justifiability/strength of their claims. A justified party issues an ultimatum for resolution whenever possible, but an unjustified party strategically bluffs with an ultimatum to establish a reputation for being justified. We show that the availability of external resolution opportunities can benefit or hurt an unjustified party in equilibrium.

Survey data and subjective beliefs in business cycle models

Anmol Bhandari, Jaroslav Borovička, and Paul Ho

This paper develops a theory of subjective beliefs that departs from rational expectations, and shows that biases in household beliefs have quantitatively large effects on macroeconomic aggregates. The departures are formalized using model-consistent notions of pessimism and optimism which are supported by extensive time-series and cross-sectional evidence from household surveys. The role subjective beliefs play in aggregate fluctuations is quantified in a business cycle model with goods and labor market frictions. Consistent with the survey evidence, an increase in pessimism generates upward biases in unemployment and inflation forecasts and lowers economic activity.

Expectations and Learning from Prices

Francesca Bastianello and Paul Fontanier

We study mislearning from equilibrium prices, and contrast this with mislearning from exogenous fundamentals. We micro-found mislearning from prices with a psychologically founded theory of “Partial Equilibrium Thinking” (PET), where traders learn fundamental information from prices, but fail to realize others do so too. PET leads to over-reaction, and upward sloping demand curves, thus contributing to more inelastic markets. The degree of individual-level over-reaction, and the extent of inelasticity varies with the composition of traders, and with the informativeness of new information.

Motivated Skepticism

Jeanne Hagenbach and Charlotte Saucet

We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Compared to neutral settings, skepticism is significantly lower when it is self-threatening, and not enhanced when it is self-serving. These results shed light on a new channel that individuals can use to protect their beliefs in communication situations: they exercise skepticism in a motivated way, that is, in a way that depends on the desirability of the conclusions that skeptical inferences lead to.

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