Accepted Papers

The Review of Economic Studies is one of the most highly respected academic journals in the field of economics. It is known for publishing leading research in all areas of economics, from microeconomics to macroeconomics. The journal is published by the Oxford University Press.

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Marriage Market and Labor Market Sorting

Paula Calvo, Ilse Lindenlaub, and Ana Reynoso

We develop a new equilibrium model in which households’ labor supply choices form the link between sorting on the marriage market and sorting on the labor market. We first show that in theory, the nature of home production—whether partners’ hours are complements or substitutes—shapes equilibrium labor supply as well as marriage and labor market sorting. We then estimate our model using German data to empirically assess the nature of home production, and find that spouses’ home hours are complements.

Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Spyros Galanis, Christos A. Ioannou, and Stelios Kotronis

We study information aggregation in a dynamic trading model. We show theoretically that separable securities, introduced by Ostrovsky (2012) in the context of Expected Utility, no longer aggregate information if some traders have imprecise beliefs and are ambiguity averse. Moreover, these securities are prone to manipulation as the degree of information aggregation can be influenced by the initial price set by the uninformed market maker.

Motives and Consequences of Libor Strategic Reporting: How Much Can We Learn from Banks’ Self-Reported Borrowing Rates?

Pietro Bonaldi

Libor is an estimate of interbank borrowing costs computed daily from rates reported by a fixed panel of banks. Evidence suggests that banks have manipulated Libor in recent years by misreporting their borrowing costs. I estimate a strategic reporting model that identifies banks’ borrowing costs as well as their motives for misreporting. The estimation places a lower bound on the value that Libor would have had if banks had truthfully reported their borrowing costs.

Outside Options in the Labor Market

Sydnee Caldwell and Oren Danieli

This paper develops a method to estimate workers’ outside employment opportunities. We outline a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity, from which we derive a sufficient statistic, the “outside options index” (OOI), for the effect of outside options on earnings, holding worker productivity constant. The OOI uses the cross-sectional concentration of similar workers across job types to quantify workers’ outside options as a function of workers’ commuting costs, preferences, and skills.

Revisiting Event Study Designs: Robust and Efficient Estimation

Kirill Borusyak, Xavier Jaravel, and Jann Spiess

We develop a framework for difference-in-differences designs with staggered treatment adoption and heterogeneous causal effects. We show that conventional regression-based estimators fail to provide unbiased estimates of relevant estimands absent strong restrictions on treatment-effect homogeneity. We then derive the efficient estimator addressing this challenge, which takes an intuitive “imputation” form when treatment-effect heterogeneity is unrestricted. We characterize the asymptotic behavior of the estimator, propose tools for inference, and develop tests for identifying assumptions.

Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labor Courts

Joyce Sadka, Enrique Seira, and Christopher Woodruff

Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use field experiments with ongoing cases to analyze sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labor court. We provide parties with personalized predictions for case outcomes and show that this information nearly doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration.

Granular Search, Market Structure, and Wages

Gregor Jarosch, Jan Sebastian Nimczik, and Isaac Sorkin

We develop a model of size-based market power in a frictional labor market. In the canonical search environment, competition for workers is encoded in outside options. In our granular setting, large employers remove their own job postings from their workers’ outside option. Thus, size gives market power and a more concentrated market structure depresses wages because it reduces competition for workers.

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Version 2.0 of the National Elections Database is online!
We now cover presidential and parliamentary elections 1789–2023, extending the post-1945 data of Electoral Turnovers @RevEconStudies (https://academic.oup.com/restud/advance-article/doi/10.1093/restud/rdae108/7899604).
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``Many networks naturally form as people come together to form subgraphs, e.g. as coauthors of a paper, or other teams. This is the basis for a new, computationally tractable method of estimating network formation."

From Chandrasekhar & @JacksonmMatt:

https://www.restud.com/a-network-formation-model-based-on-subgraphs/

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Recently accepted to #REStud, ``Simultaneous Search and Adverse Selection," from Auster, Gottardi and Wolthoff @rpwolthoff:

https://www.restud.com/simultaneous-search-and-adverse-selection/

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Recently accepted to #REStud, ``Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Costly Entry," from Murto & Välimäki:

https://www.restud.com/affiliated-common-value-auctions-with-costly-entry/

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