Table of Contents

This page contains abstracts and articles of past editions of the Review. Access to abstracts is open to all readers. Full text access is restricted to subscribers only.

Volume 68: Issue 1, January 2001

1. Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents.
SHINGO ISHIGURO, Ritsumeikan University.
HIDESHI ITOH, Hitotsubashi University.

• Abstract • Article •

2. Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability.
TRACEY R. LEWIS, University of Florida.
DAVID E. M. SAPPINGTON, University of Florida.

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3. Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle.
JAMES A. FAIRBURN, University of Sussex.
JAMES M. MALCOMSON, University of Oxford.

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4. Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy.
TIMOTHY BESLEY, London School of Economics.
STEPHEN COATES, Cornell University.

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5. The Role of Market Size in the Formation of Jurisdictions.
ALESSANDRA CASELLA, Columbia University, Greqam, NBER, and CEPR.

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6. A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty.
ROGER LAGUNOFF, Georgetown University.

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7. Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices.
CARLO PERRONI, University of Warwick.
KIMBERLEY A. SCHARF, University of Warwick, IFS, and CEPR.

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8. Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders.
JEAN-PIERRE BENOÎT, New York University.
VIJAY KRISHNA, Penn State University.

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9. Wealth Inequality and Asset Pricing.
CHRISTIAN GOLLIER, GREMAQ, IDEI, and Université de Toulouse.

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10. Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates.
EMMANUEL SAEZ, Harvard University and NBER.

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